Introduction
The corporate form has consistently proven to be a superior method of business organization. Great industrial economies have grown and prospered where the corporate legal structure has been prevalent. This organizational form, however, has not existed and served without flaw. The multiple problems arising out of the fundamental agency nature of the corporate relationship have continually hindered its complete economic effectiveness. Where ownership and management are structurally separated, how does one assure effective operational efficiencies? Traditionally, the solution lay in the establishment of a powerful monitoring intermediary -the board of directors, whose primary responsibility was management oversight and control for the benefit of the residual equity owners. To assure an effective agency, traditionally, the board was chosen by and comprised generally of the business's largest shareholders. Substantial shareholdership acted to align board and shareholder interests to create the best incentive for effective oversight. Additionally, legal fiduciary duties evolved to prevent director self dealing, through the medium of the duty of loyalty, and to discourage lax monitoring, through the duty of care. No direct compensation for board service was permitted.
1 By the early 1930's, however, in the largest public corporations, the board was no longer essentially the dominion of the company's most substantial shareholders.
The early twentieth century witnessed not only the phenomenal growth of the American economy, but also the growth of those corporate entities whose activities comprised that economy. Corporations were no longer local ventures owned, controlled, and managed by a 1 For a detailed discussion on the history of director compensation and its relationship to shareholder dominance of corporate boards, see Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board: The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 135-56 (1996) [hereinafter Elson, Director handful of local entrepreneurs, but instead had become national in size and scope. Concomitant with the rise of the large-scale corporation came the development of the professional management class, whose skills were needed to run such far-flung enterprises.
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And as the capitalization required to maintain such entities grew, so did the number of individuals required to contribute the funds to create such capital. Thus, we saw the rise of the large-scale public corporationowned not by a few, but literally thousands and thousands of investors located throughout the nation. And with this growth in the size and ownership levels of the modern corporation, individual shareholdings in these ventures became proportionally smaller and smaller, with no shareholder or shareholding group now owning enough stock to dominate the entity.
Consequently, the professional managers moved in to fill this control vacuum. Through control of the proxy process, incumbent management nominated its own candidates for board membership. The board of directors, theoretically composed of the representatives of various Compensation. 2 Coincident with the rise of a new managerial class, was the development of an educational system to train this group. The creation of the modern business school and collegiate business curriculum was a response to the need for the professional manager. A history of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business written in 1954 details this phenomenon:
In the Wharton school, before the nineteenth century ended, business education began to shift in interest and emphasis from the general to the special, from the speculative to the practical, to the scientific, to the professional.
The remarkable spread of collegiate business education during the last forty years is not difficult to explain. It has been part and parcel of the growth and expansion of American economic activity. The increase in the number, in the size, and the complexity of business enterprises has given rise to progressive needs for better means and methods of supervision management, and control, as well as for highly specialized services designed to meet the requirements created by the division and the diversification of functions of the individual enterprise. Among all the needs of the business world, none has given greater concern than the need for a high grade of managerial personnel, competent to analyze problems as they arise and competent to cope with them promptly and successfully.
The main tasks of schools of business are (1) the training of technicians in fundamentals recognized as measurably common to a variety of businesses; and (2) the developing, in a carefully selected group of students, of an awareness of factors underlying policy and planning in business enterprise requiring the exercise of managerial responsibility and judgment. THURMAN W. VAN METRE, A HISTORY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 6, 7, 9 (1954). 4 shareholding groups, instead was comprised of individuals selected by management. The directors' connection with the enterprise generally resulted from a prior relationship with management, not the stockholding owners, and they often had little or no shareholding stake in the company. 3 Berle and Means, in their path-breaking book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, described this phenomenon of the domination of the large public corporation by professional management as the separation of ownership and control. 4 The firm's nominal owners, the shareholders, in such companies exercised virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-term policy. 5 Instead control was vested in the professional managers who typically owned only a very small portion of the firm's shares. 6 See id. 5 rendering board service. However, as the shareholders' legal fiduciaries, the outside directors were still expected to expend independent time and effort in their roles, and, consequently, it began to be recognized that they must now be compensated directly for their activities.
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The consequences of this shift in the composition of the board was to exacerbate the agency problem inherent in the corporate form. Without the direct economic incentive of substantial stock ownership , directors, given a natural loyalty to their appointing party and the substantial reputation enhancement and monetary compensation board service came to entail, had little incentive other than their legal fiduciary duties to engage in active managerial oversight. It may also be argued that the large compensation received for board service may have actually acted as a disincentive for active management monitoring, given management control over the director appointment and retention process.
Since the identification of this phenomenon, both legal and finance theorists have struggled to formulate effective solutions. Numerous legal reforms have been proposed, often involving such acts as the creation of the professional "independent director," REV. 1037 REV. (1996 .
11 The effects of a derelict board are evidenced by the recent fortunes at a number of well-known American companies. The recent turmoil at General Motors, IBM, AT&T, Archer-Daniels-Midland, W.R. Grace, and Morrison Knudsen demonstrates the consequences of an inattentive board. Throughout its history, the GM Board was typically beholden to GM management with board meetings being little more than social gatherings in which the CEO's agenda was approved. After a long, steady decline during which GM's share of the American car market dropped from 52% to 35%, the GM Board finally took affirmative steps to improve the company's performance, including firing GM's CEO Robert Stempel. See John Greenwald, What Went Wrong?, TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 42, 44 ; see also Dana W. Linden et al., The Cosseted Director, FORBES, May 22, 1995, at 168; Kathleen Day, GM's Move Symbolizes Wider Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1992, at Al (noting that " boards typically have been captive to the wishes of the company chairman," but that pressure has been mounting on the boards to assume a more proactive stance in the fulfillment of their duties).
In January 1993, IBM CEO John Akers was forced to resign amid sagging profits and lost market share. Preceding this resignation, IBM saw its worldwide market share drop from 30% in 1985 to 19% in 1991 The governance committee recommended that the size of the board be reduced from its current size of 17 members to between 9-15 members and that a majority of the board members be outside directors. The committee defined an outside director as someone " who is not a current or former Archer-Daniels executive, has no material business or professional relationship with the company, has no close family relationship with the company's management and is not receiving compensation from the company other than as a director." Kurt Eichenwald, Shift by Company Will Bring in More Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996 , at D1. The committee also proposed a mandatory age 70 board retirement policy. Id. Additionally, the committee recommended that the directors' pension plan be eliminated and the board members be compensated 50% in company stock. Id.
On March 2, 1995, it was reported that J.P. Bolduc, W.R. Grace's president and CEO, had abruptly resigned following a long dispute with the former company chairman, Peter Grace. It had been alleged that Grace and his son had received substantial stipends from the company in addition to their regular salaries. Grace himself, in addition to his monthly consulting fee of $50,000, received $165,000 annually for nursing care, $200,000 for security guards, $30,000 for a full-time cook, and $74,500 to maintain a New York apartment largely for his family's personal use. Later, pressure from institutional shareholders forced the company to announce substantial changes in the structure of its board, including a reduction of the board's size, an age limit of 70 for directors, and the inclusion of six new outside directors. Yet the solution may be simple and obvious. Traditionally, directors, as large shareholders, had a powerful personal incentive to exercise effective oversight. It was the equity ownership that created an effective agency. To recreate this powerful monitoring incentive, directors must become substantial shareholders once again. This is the theoretical underpinning behind the current movement toward equity-based compensation for corporate directors. The idea is to reunite ownership and control through meaningful director stock ownership and hence better management monitoring.
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Underpinning this theory, however, is the assumption that equity ownership by directors does in fact create more active monitoring. In this paper, we attempt to demonstrate empirically a link between significant outside director stock ownership, effective monitoring and firm performance. Mar. 31, 1995, at B4. In 1992, Morrison Knudsen's chairman William Agee announced that he wanted to turn the construction company into a rail-car maker. The effort initially seemed successful; however, one year later, in July 1994, the company announced an unexpected second-quarter loss of $40.5 million and disclosed delays with various construction projects as well as with testing and delivery of new rail-cars. In early 1995, the company announced that it expected a substantial loss for 1994, was in default on its loan agreements, and would eliminate its dividend. Agee was then relieved of his duties, and it was disclosed that he had attempted to run the Boise, Idaho-based company from his Pebble Beach, California estate, flying in corporate vice presidents for weekly briefings. His 1993 compensation of $2.4 million amounted to 6.8% of MK's net income; the $4 million spent on Mr. Agee's jet equaled 13% of the general and administrative budget. Board resignations followed and eventually the entire board was replaced. The primary responsibility of the corporate board of directors is to engage, monitor, and, when necessary, replace company management. The central criticism of many modern public company boards has been their failure to engage in the kind of active management oversight that results in more effective corporate performance. It has been suggested that substantial equity ownership by the outside directors creates a personally-based incentive to actively monitor. An integral part of the monitoring process is the replacement of the CEO when circumstances warrant. An active, non-management obligated board will presumably make the necessary change sooner rather than later, as a poorly performing management team creates more harm to the overall enterprise the longer it is in place. On the other hand, a management dominated board, because of its loyalty to the company executives, will take much longer to replace a poor performing management team because of strong loyalty ties.
Consequently, it may be argued that companies where the CEO is replaced expeditiously in times of poor performance may have more active and effective monitoring boards than those companies where ineffective CEO's remain in office for longer periods of time. An examination, therefore, of the equity-holding positions of the outside directors of the companies where CEO succession occurs more expeditiously and those where it does not, should provide some evidence of the effect of equity ownership on management monitoring by outside directors.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section describes our sample and data for stock-ownership and compensation of board members as a group, and performance measures for our sample firms. Section three considers determinants of stock and stock option compensation for board members. Section four discusses the relation between director stock ownership and firm performance. Section five considers the relation between firm performance and CEO turnover. The subsequent section provides evidence on the impact of director ownership and firm performance on CEO turnover. The final section discusses some policy implications.
Sample and Data
A sample of about 1700 publicly-held U.S. companies was obtained from S&P's Execucomp database. This sample consists of the S&P 500 firms (for 1995), the S&P mid-cap 400 firms (for 1996) , and the S&P small-cap 600 firms (for 1996). Table 1 provides summary statistics on director compensation and company size for the sample firms. The average annual director cash compensation (retainer) for our entire sample of 1724 U.S. companies is $16,300 for 1992, and increases to $18,300 in 1996.
The extant literature notes that firm-size is a significant determinant of CEO compensation, for example, see Jensen and Murphy (1990) ; hence it is possible that firm-size is also a significant determinant of director compensation.
14 We decided to partition our sample by firm-size: large, medium, and small-size firms. We partitioned our sample of 1724 firms into roughly three groups by firm-size (sales); firms in the top-third of sales were classified as large companies, and firms in the bottom-third of sales were classified as small companies.
For 1996, firms with sales less than $0.5 billion were classified as small; firms with sales between $3.2 and $160 billion were classified as large.
The annual director cash compensation has experienced a secular increase during 1992-1996 for small and large firms. For small firms the cash compensation increased from $7,500 in 1992 to $10,700 in 1996. For large firms the cash compensation increased from $23,700 in 1992 to $26,700 in 1996. As Table 2 Equity-based compensation is a feature of many board-compensation plans. The number of shares granted to a director has increased from 70 shares in 1992 to 120 shares in 1996 for our entire sample (Table 1, Panel A). For small firms, the number of shares granted doubled from 60 shares in 1992 to 110 shares in 1996. For large firms, the number of shares granted has increased from 110 shares in 1992 to 240 shares in 1996.
The number of stock-options granted to directors is significantly more than number of shares granted. The number of stock-options granted has increased from 1,550 in 1992 to 2,220 in 1996 for all firms in our sample (Table 1 ). The number of options granted to smallfirm directors has remained roughly constant at 2,250 stock-options. The number of stockoptions granted to large-firm directors has more than doubled from 410 stock-options in 1992 12 to 1,030 in 1996. Table 3 details the summary statistics of the financial performance measures of our sample firms. The return on assets, ROA, of our sample firms has stayed roughly constant at 4% during 1992-1996. The return on assets is generally smaller for small-firms compared to large-firms.
The average annual stock-market returns for our sample firms is 21.64% for 1992, 25.21% for 1993, 0.97% for 1994, 29.76% for 1995, and 19.36% for 1997. These returns are rather high compared to historical norms in the U.S. stock market, but reflect the 1990s bull market in the U.S. The average five-year stock-market return is 9.89% for small-firms compared to 15.15% for large-firms. The higher stock-market return and ROA for large-firms vis-à-vis small firms is different from the historical comparative experience of large and small firms in the U.S. Historically, returns on small firms are generally higher than large firms; for example, see Fama and French (1992) . 15 
Determinants of Director Compensation
As noted above, firm-size appears to be a determinant of director compensation. Jensen and Murphy (1990) have argued that stock-ownership is quite important in aligning the incentives of managers with that of shareholders, and increasing the pay-for-performance sensitivity. An impressive set of recent papers suggest that stock-options might be even more relevant in aligning the incentives of managers with that of shareholders -see Hall and 15 E.F. Fama and K.R. French, "
The cross-section of expected stock returns," 1992, Journal of Finance 47, 427-466.
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Liebman (1997), Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996) , and Berger and Ofek (1997 • Also, for the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 , there is a negative relation between granting of shares and the company's stock-market returns during the current and two previous years. This suggests that during 1994, 1995, and 1996 -companies that underperformed the stock-market were more likely to grant shares to their directors.
• Interestingly, there is no relation between granting of shares to directors in any of the years 1992-1995 and subsequent stock-performance of the company.
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• Finally, we consider the relation between a company's growth opportunities and granting of shares to directors. We measure a company's growth opportunities as the ratio of the market value of the company's stock divided by the book value of the company's stock. 17 Efficient market considerations would suggest no relation between future stock returns and any current observable event, such as, granting of shares to directors. An efficient market would impound the value consequences of such events, in this case -granting of shares, and incorporate them into the share price at the time the stock-market participants were first made aware of this event. We will also consider accounting performance measures, to partially address this concern.
18 The literature suggests many more sophisticated ways of measuring a company' s growth opportunities. However, evidence in Gaver and Gaver (1993), and Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996) suggests that our simple measure is not much inferior, if at all, to the more sophisticated measures. W. R. Baber, S. N. Janakiraman, and S. Kang, id. J. Gaver and K. Gaver, " Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," 1993, Journal of 14 no significant relationship between granting of shares to directors and a company's growth opportunities. • There is no consistent and significant relation between the company's stock-market returns during the current and two previous years and whether or not the company grants stock options to its directors.
• There is a positive relation between granting of stock options to directors during 1992 and 1993 and subsequent stock-performance of the company. However, such a relation is not observed for 1994, 1995, or 1996. • Finally, we find a significant positive relationship between granting of stock options to directors and a company's growth opportunities. In other words, companies that have more growth opportunities are more likely to include stock options in their directors' compensation package. While we observe this result for each of the years, 1992 through 1996, there is a suggestion in our data that this relationship is growing stronger with each year, that is, the relationship is stronger for 1993 compared to 1992 and so on. This result is even more interesting given the fact that we have already controlled for the effect of firm-size. options, is similar across small, mid-size, and large firms, and is just over $100,000. This suggests, as our results did in Table 4 , that ownership of options might play a critical role in understanding director compensation --especially in smaller companies. Table 6 • The dollar value of the median director's stock-holdings is positively related to the company's growth opportunities. There is no relationship between the percentage of the median director's stock-holdings and the company's growth opportunities.
Director Ownership and Company Performance
• There is a positive relation between a company's prior performance and the dollar value of the median director's stock-holdings, for all measures of performance except growth in operating income. There is no consistent relationship between the percentage of the median director's stock-holdings and the company's prior performance.
• Finally, there is a positive relation between a company's future sales growth and the dollar value of the median director's stock-holdings. There is a negative relation between a 18 company's future sales growth and the percentage of the median director's stock-holdings.
Such a significant relation is not observed for the other measures of performance. Table 7 indicates that of the 449 companies that we have director ownership data on, 1162 companies experienced CEO turnover during 19919-1997. News articles from LexisNexis were read to determine probable cause for the CEO turnover. We are interested in CEO turnover as a result of disciplinary action initiated by the board related to poor performance.
Firm Performance and CEO Turnover
The Appendix contains two news articles each for CEO turnover classified as "retired," "older than 63," "resigned," and "no reason given." These news articles suggest that CEO turnover associated with "resigned" and "no reason given" are more likely to be disciplinary. We emphasize that not every CEO turnover in the "resigned" or "no reason given" category is disciplinary; we cannot be sure of the disciplinary nature of the turnover in every case because many of the press releases and news articles are unclear on this issue. Hence, to avoid too much subjectivity in our analysis, we decided to classify every CEO turnover associated with "resigned" and "no reason given" as disciplinary. Also, not every CEO turnover due to retirement is unrelated to possible disciplinary actin. We are assuming that CEO turnover associated with "resigned" and "no reason given" and more likely to be disciplinary, whereas CEO turnovers associated with retirements are less likely to be disciplinary. 21 Table 8 indicates that firm performance measured prior to CEO turnover is quite poor when the turnover is due to a resignation or no reason is given in the news article. For 21 In econometric terms: We are biasing our tests in favor of the null hypothesis that CEO turnover, firm performance and board ownership are unrelated. example, the average 3-year stock return prior to CEO turnover classified as "resigned" or compared to 16.7% for other firms in the same industry that did not experience a CEO turnover during 1991-1997. (The average 3-year stock return prior to CEO resignations is -0.4%, and 5.0% when no reason is given.) 6. Director Ownership, Firm Performance and CEO Turnover Table 9 Table 10 provides summary statistics on CEO turnover, dollar value of median director's stock holding, percentage holding of median director, and company performance for 302 companies for which have the requisite data. 22 For firms with the worst performance (the prior 3-year stock return is less than -10%), there is a 61% probability of observing a disciplinary CEO turnover, compared to 25% for average performance (the prior 3-year stock return is between -10% and 10%), and 17% for good performance (the prior 3-year stock return is greater than 10%). Also, for firms with the worst performance (the prior 3-year stock return is less than -10%), the median dollar value of the median director's stock holding is $470,000 when a 22 In computing the dollar value and percentage holding of the median director, we consider three definitions of the median director: First, we consider all directors in determining the median director. Second, we consider all directors except the CEO in determining the median director. Finally, we only consider the outside directors in determining the median director. As shown in table 10, the results on the median director' s stock holdings are qualitatively identical under any of these three definitions of median director. Also, Table 11 reports logit regression results similar to the logit regressions in Table 9 , Panel A, except we use the latter two definitions of median director; the results are identical to that in 
Policy Implications
The purpose of this paper has been to study the linkage between significant outside director stock ownership, effective monitoring and firm performance. Through an examination of the impact of director equity ownership on general firm performance and, more specifically, CEO turnover in poor performing enterprises, we sought to understand this linkage. Our results were consistent with our initial hypothesis of a connection between substantial director share ownership and better monitoring. First, we found a significant correlation between the amount of stock owned by individual outside directors and firm performance (based on a variety of performance measures). Second, and more important for our analysis, we found that greater the dollar value of the individual outside director's equity-holdings in the enterprise, the more likely that one would witness a disciplinary-type CEO turnover in a poorly-performing company.
As for our first finding, that there appears to be a correlation between significant director stock ownership and heightened corporate performance, one explanation for this phenomenon would be that the equity ownership created better management monitoring on the part of the board and hence improved results. This would, of course, be consistent with our original 22 hypothesis. There is, however, an alternative explanation that would counter our initial conclusion. It might be argued that the directors, possessing insider information about the company and its prospects, simply, in the case of a successful operation, increased their individual holdings to take advantage of the company's anticipated success. This explains the hesitance on the part of the academic and professional communities to confirm that earlier studies on the linkage between director equity ownership and corporate performance clearly demonstrated a linkage between board equity possession and more effective monitoring.
It is, therefore, our second finding that has the greatest significance for the future and impact of director equity ownership. The fact that we have observed a correlation between the dollar amount of a director's personal equity holdings and the likelihood of a disciplinary-type CEO succession in a poorly performing company, is consistent with the hypothesis --that the equity positions of the outside directors created the kind of heightened awareness among the board of the impact of an inadequate management team and that led to its early termination.
While the empirical evidence we have gathered strongly suggests this linkage between substantial director stockholdings and better monitoring, the anecdotal evidence also seems to confirm our findings. One of the authors of this study served as a director of a major public corporation which, following a relatively short period of poor performance, replaced its CEO in a disciplinary succession. Each outside director at that company was both completely compensated for his or her service on the board in company stock and was required to purchase substantial amounts of company equity prior to board service.
23
What then is the significance of our findings? There is a probable correlation between substantial individual director equity-holding and better management monitoring. Whether this 23 improved monitoring actually leads to better corporate performance or simply the replacement of a poorly-performing management team prior to a fatal consequence to the company's fortunes, should be the subject of future research. However, our findings lend research support to the movement for increased director equity ownership and provide the empirical basis for a board-focused legal reform currently being prepared.
In a recent report, the National Association of Corporate Directors' (NACD) Best
Practices Council on Coping with Fraud and Other Illegal Activity proposed restructuring the traditional procedurally-based legal duty of care into a more aspirational equity-centered duty.
Following the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. VanGorkom, while most directordecisionmaking was entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule, certain procedures were to be followed by a board to avail itself of that rule's protection. But as most commentators would agree, these procedures have led not to more effective management oversight but, instead, to a classic triumph of form over function--where, although prescribed procedure has been followed, decisionmaking appears to be little more than staged play-acting, absent critical engaged oversight. Consequently, the NACD Council suggested a new legal approach. Independent and disinterested directors with meaningful equity ownership would be entitled to a presumption that as directors they have acted as rational economic beings in their own economic interest and have consequently met their legal duty of care. Therefore, no longer would rote adherence to judicially-mandated decisionmaking procedures be the norm, but director decisionmaking and oversight based on proprietary interest--that board action in what was in the shareholders' best interest would become the rule. The duty of care for an equity-holding director would hence be more aspirational than litigation and procedure- 23 We are referring to the case of Sunbeam Corporation, and the recent CEO turnover in that company.
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centered, as ownership, rather than the threat of legal action, would create the desired behavior. Central, of course, to this recommendation is some kind of evidence that substantial director-equity ownership actually leads to better management monitoring. This paper provides such evidence.
While a direct causal linkage between director stockholdings and heightened corporate performance may only be tentatively suggested by our findings, it is clear that given the results of our CEO turnover analysis, better management monitoring and substantial board equity ownership are correlated. Hence, empirical support for the notion of an equity-based director duty of care has been provided. This is why we believe that our results have such significance. The linkage between director equity ownership and heightened management monitoring will provide the basis for much needed reform in the legal arena governing director behavior. Board equity, we believe, will create the kind of effective boards that the shareholding public expects and demands.
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and Company Performance for 449 US Companies (t-statistics in parentheses)
Panel A: The dependent variable is 1 if the CEO resigned or if no reason was given for the CEO' s departure in the press release, and 0 for the control firms (picked on basis of industry) that experienced no CEO turnover during 1991-1997.
Independent Variables
Performance Measure (measured prior to turnover) 3-year Growth in EPS Table 9 continued Panel D: The dependent variable is 1 if the CEO resigned or if no reason was given for the CEO' s departure in the press release, and 0 for the control firms (picked on basis of industry) that experienced no CEO turnover during 1991-1997. In Panels A, B, and C, director ownership 
